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Systematic variation in the outcomes of public sector wage-setting (PSWS) persists in Europe. 
PSWS is generally analyzed as a problem of inter-sectoral wage-coordination in political 
economy literature. To do justice to PSWS’ unique features, this article advances a state-
centered theoretical framework which treats PSWS by political employers as fiscal 
policymaking characterized by the common-pool problem and special-interest politics. Drawing 
on insights from public economics scholarship, the article thus argues that systematic public 
sector wage restraint occurs within states where the governance of PSWS is structured 
according to two models which I term the delegation and regulation models of PSWS. Through 
a combination of six case studies, elite interviews and archival research, the article shows that 
variation in PSWS hinges on the various capacity of state institutions to minimize special-
interest politics’ externalities across countries. These findings advance our understanding of 
PSWS and the role of the state in public policymaking. 
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Enacting wage policy for the country’s public administration ensures the ongoing operations of 
the state. In fact, public sector wage-setting (PSWS) is a cumbersome task for state employers, 
because of the important implications it carries for the country’s public finances and economic 
competitiveness; the state is the single largest employer in advanced economies (Hyman 
2013), employing around 20% of total employees (OECD 2019). The wage bill absorbs more 
than ¼ of governments’ current expenditures—an average of 10% of GDP in European 
countries1. As a result, expansionary wage policies in the public sector jeopardize public 
finances, engender export competitiveness and contribute to countries’ current account deficits 
(Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014). It is therefore not surprising that preventing negative 
spillovers from expansionary wage-setting in the public sector is a crucial concern for 
governments (Calmfors 1993). 
While steady public sector expansion went undisputed during Europe’s Trente Glorieuses 
(Rose et al. 1985), since the 1980s there has been a major shift from the active Keynesian 
state to New Public Management (NPM) and regulatory governance (Hood 1995; Majone 
1994). Besides winding back government intervention in the economy, central to this shift was 
the need to install the market mechanism into public sector employment relations, hitherto 
mainly subjected to public law status (Bach et al. 1999). Given the secular slowdown of growth 
and productivity rates, governments have begun containing public sector wage growth to shore 
up public finances and ensure competitiveness in global markets (Oxley et al. 1991; Oxley and 
Martin 1991). Despite these common challenges, however, states have not converged toward 
the neoliberal night-watchman state (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011); nor have public sector 
employment relations systems, which remain hardwired into their path-dependent legal and  
administrative systems (Bach and Bordogna 2011). As a result, cross-country variation in 
PSWS outcomes persists stubbornly in Europe: some countries feature expansionary public 
sector wage policies while others systematic wage restraint (Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010; Müller 
and Schulten 2015). How do we account for cross-country variation in PSWS outcomes across 
Western Europe? 
This question remains relatively understudied in the literature. Drawing on classic neo-
corporatist thinking, scholars have largely treated PSWS as a problem of wage co-ordination 
between exporting and sheltered sectors (Garrett and Way 1999; Hancké 2013; Johnston 
2012; 2016; 2011; Traxler and Brandl 2010). This scholarship shows that restrictive PSWS 
depends on the presence of neo-corporatist wage bargaining regimes, which constrain public 
sector unions’ capacity to extract inflationary wage increases due to centralized bargaining or 
mechanisms of inter-sectoral wage co-ordination. These insights remain central to our 
understanding of contemporary wage-setting regimes. However, in this paper I question their 
applicability to PSWS by showing that neo-corporatist wage-setting regimes are neither 
necessary nor sufficient institutional prerequisites for public sector wage restraint. Hence, by 
borrowing insights from public economics scholarship, I advance a new state-centered 
theoretical framework for the study of PSWS. Instead of a wage co-ordination problem, I posit 
that PSWS is better comprehended as a classic common-pool problem of public finances (Von 
Hagen and Harden 1995), characterized by special-interest politics (Persson and Tabellini 
2016). Thus, I argue that cross-country variation is better explained by variation in the 
institutional configuration of PSWS governance systems, which minimize these problems 
differently across countries. 
PSWS is in fact fundamentally different from private sector wage-setting due to the common-
pool problem. Public wages are funded by political employers spending general taxpayers’ 
 
1 Calculations based on data from AMECO database. 
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money on benefits targeted to a specific social group: public employees. Thus, fiscal spending 
on PSWS generates a clear-cut mismatch between the benefits of public spending, 
internalized by the public sector groups, and the costs, externalized onto the collectivity. This 
gives rise to special-interest politics: public sector narrowly-based interest groups are well-
organized and have clear incentives to act as “distributional coalitions” (Olson 1986) to 
appropriate the maximum share of public resources to the advantage of their organizations 
and their members. Simultaneously, the conflict of interest between capital and labor is absent 
in PSWS because there is no profit-making motive in the provision of public services. Instead, 
political employers have strong incentives to grant generous wage increases in exchange for 
public employees’ votes and public sector unions’ political support. As a result of these 
features, PSWS tends to be inherently inflationary because of a mutually-convenient political 
exchange (Pizzorno 1978) between the parts. Given these general features of PSWS, how do 
we make sense of cross-country variation?  
Taking the cue from public economics scholarship (Hallerberg 2004; Hallerberg and Von 
Hagen 1997), I contend that cross-country variation in PSWS depends on the presence of 
state institutions that limit the PSWS in-built common-pool problem. Based on archival 
material, elite interviews and an original combination of most-similar (France and Italy) and 
most-different (Germany and Portugal) case studies with shadow cases (Belgium and Greece), 
I argue that wage restraint occurs in countries where two distinctive institutional configurations 
govern the conduct of PSWS. I term these the delegation and the regulation models of PSWS 
governance. Under the former, wage restraint occurs because the determination of PSWS is 
centralized under the remits of the finance ministry—the bulwark of the state’s fiscal 
responsibility—or an independent state agency with a mandate and powers to ensure a de-
politicized PSWS. Under the regulation model, wage restraint occurs because the 
determination of PSWS is regulated through ex ante rules imposing ceilings to PSWS. In the 
absence of either governance system, PSWS tends to fall prey to special-interest politics and 
results in volatile trajectories of expansion and restraint, depending on governments’ fiscal 
capacity. 
The paper makes three contributions to comparative political economy scholarship. First, the 
paper advances our understanding of wage-setting dynamics in Europe. It shows that, 
differently from standard assumptions held in neo-corporatist scholarship (Di Carlo 2018a), 
PSWS is often independent from the dominance of export-sector interests and co-ordination 
institutions. Hence, PSWS should be studied for its own sake; it yields broader insights into 
the study of countries’ fiscal policymaking and distributive politics. Second, the paper advances 
our understanding of states’ role as public employers. It shows that states are neither neutral 
industrial relations actors—captured by export-sector interests—nor monolithic blocs. Rather, 
studying intra-state dynamics is important to comprehend the various processes and outcomes 
of public policymaking in different countries. Third, the paper shows that the state’s institutions 
and practices matter insofar as they shape economic policy outcomes with broader 
implications for a country’s growth model (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Hassel and Palier 
2021). 
The argument proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the shortcomings of the neo-
corporatist approach. In the section that follows, I lay out the alternative state-centered 
theoretical framework of PSWS. In the following two sections I first discuss the logic of case 
selection to then demonstrate the framework’s explanatory capacity through in-depth case 
studies. Lastly, in the conclusions, I wrap up the findings and discuss the importance of PSWS 
for burgeoning debates on growth models. 
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Neo-corporatism: the institutional pre-conditions for public sector wage 
restraint 
The study of PSWS has loosely concerned three different literatures. Labor economists have 
focused on estimating the wage gap between public and private sector employees in 
comparable professions (Giordano et al. 2011; Lucifora and Meurs 2006; Postel-Vinay 2015). 
Industrial relations experts have provided insightful yet descriptive analyses of public sector 
employment regimes (Bach and Bordogna 2016; Bach et al. 1999). To my knowledge, it is thus 
mainly the structuralist variant2 of the neo-corporatist scholarship that has investigated the 
processes and outcomes of PSWS in detail (Crouch 1990; Garrett and Way 1999; Traxler and 
Brandl 2010). 
Neo-corporatist studies have argued that a country’s capacity for wage restraint depends on 
the presence of particular institutional prerequisites, i.e. centralized or coordinated wage 
bargaining regimes3 (Scharpf 1991; Soskice 1990). In the former, encompassing unions are 
forced to moderate their wage claims within confederal agreements because expansionary 
wage policy across-the-board generates inflation spillovers, thereby jeopardizing their 
members’ purchasing power and export-sector jobs. In the latter, wage restraint pursued by 
the export-sector—interested in international cost-competitiveness—is imposed on sheltered 
sectors through institutional mechanisms of inter-sectoral co-ordination. 
Drawing on this logic, scholars have thus argued that cross-country variation in PSWS 
outcomes hinges on the presence of neo-corporatist wage bargaining regimes preventing 
public sector unions from extracting “unmerited wage increases” (Johnston 2012). These 
institutional regimes range from pattern bargaining systems of inter-sectoral co-ordination (e.g. 
Germany), to centralized incomes policies (Finland), wage laws (Belgium) and export-oriented 
wage co-ordination imposed by the state (France) (Hancké 2013; Johnston 2016; Johnston 
and Hancke 2009). However, events suggest variation in neo-corporatist wage bargaining 
regimes cannot fully account for PSWS outcomes. In fact, centralized or coordinated wage 
bargaining regimes appear neither necessary nor sufficient institutional conditions for public 
sector wage restraint. To see why, consider these observations. 
Germany is the most representative case of inter-sectoral wage coordination through pattern 
bargaining. Yet, recent scholarship has documented a sharp divergence between the export 
and public sector’s wage trajectories (see Figure 4), which is hard to reconcile with inter-
sectoral wage co-ordination (Di Carlo 2020). Marked public sector wage restraint has been 
imposed by Germany’s state employers to shore up public finances in light of Germany’s fiscal 
crisis at the turn of the century (Di Carlo 2019). Therefore, although pattern bargaining may be 
a sufficient institutional mechanism to generate wage restraint, it is certainly unnecessary in 
the public sector when governments face budgetary problems. The broader validity of this 
observation is corroborated by last decade’s events. Extant scholarship argues that, before 
the Eurozone crisis, countries lacking neo-corporatist wage-setting regimes experienced 
inflationary PSWS (Johnston and Hancke 2009). This is true. However, when the crisis hit, 
independently of domestic wage-setting regimes, virtually all European governments 
imposed—unilaterally—wage freezes/cuts in the public sector through their legislative powers 
 
2 The concept of neo-corporatism comes in different theoretical variants (Molina and Rhodes 2002; Streeck and Kenworthy 2005) and empirical 
applications (Jahn 2014; Kenworthy 2003; Siaroff 1999). In the CPE literature, it describes both a distinctive structure of interest representation 
(Schmitter 1974) and an inclusive mode of economic governance, i.e. concertation (Baccaro 2003; Grant 1985; Schmitter 1982). While 
acknowledging this distinction, this paper engages only with the structuralist variant for it is through the institutional features of wage-setting 
systems that scholars have explained cross-country variation in PSWS. 
3 Calmfors and Driffill (1988) demonstrated that fully decentralized wage-setting systems would be functionally equivalent to centralized ones. 
However, atomistic wage-setting systems are rare in the public sector. 
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(Bach and Bordogna 2016; Glassner 2010; Vaughan-Whitehead 2013). Thus, neo-corporatist 
accounts of PSWS fail to explain why similar structures lead to different outcomes over time. 
Moreover, consider the Irish and Italian experiences. Ireland entered EMU with a centralized 
wage-setting regime based on national social partnership, institutionalized since 1987 (Regan 
2012). In the early 1990s, Italy adopted a coordinated wage-setting regime based on 
centralized wage policies anchored to the forecast inflation rate as agreed nationally (Regalia 
and Regini 1998). Yet, despite this neo-corporatist fine-tuning, both countries experienced a 
marked trajectory of public sector wage growth well above the private sector (Müller and 
Schulten 2015). Hence, although certainly helpful, neo-corporatist practices or institutional 
structures seem insufficient to ensure restraint in the public sector.  
In all, the problem with neo-corporatist accounts of PSWS seems to lie in an excessive focus 
on the institutional structures that best constrain sheltered sector unions’ rent-seeking 
behavior. While insightful, this approach overlooks that PSWS is fiscal policy enacted by 
political employers (Beaumont 1992). In public sector industrial relations, in fact, the 
government “occupies two seats” (Hyman 2013). It represents the management side but it is 
also the state’s political and fiscal authority with the capacity to impose its wage preferences 
via unilateral administrative acts (Traxler 1999). In fact, even where public sector collective 
bargaining exists, negotiations with the labor counterpart always occur under a “shadow of 
hierarchy” (Scharpf 1997), where the state maintains the ultimate power to enforce restraint in 
PSWS unilaterally and does not require neo-corporatist institutional prerequisites. The relevant 
puzzle in the political economy of PSWS thus becomes why governments fail to pursue 
restrictive PSWS in good times despite having the powers to do so. This behooves us to adopt 
an alternative theoretical framework to make sense of PSWS’s sui generis nature and uncover 
the conditions under which public sector wage restraint occurs. 
 
Regulation and Delegation: the two institutional configurations for public 
sector wage restraint 
The special-interest politics of PSWS   
Moving beyond the neo-corporatist approach, this paper posits that PSWS is better 
comprehended as a case of fiscal policymaking characterized by the classic common-pool 
problem of public finance, which gives rise to special-interest politics. The core of fiscal 
policymaking in democracy is that politicians receive a mandate from voters to spend other 
people’s money. The common-pool problem is thus central to the study of public finance (Von 
Hagen 2008). It arises anytime politicians can spend general taxpayers’ money on policies 
which are, instead, targeted to specific groups of beneficiaries (Hallerberg, Strauch, and Von 
Hagen 2007). Since the costs of funding these policies are diffused—i.e. paid by all the 
taxpayers—while the benefits are concentrated—i.e. enjoyed only by the group members—, 
there is a mismatch between those who pay for public policy and those who benefit from it. In 
other words, while a targeted group (e.g. the public sector employees) internalizes the full 
benefits of spending bids (e.g. on public sector wage increases), the additional burden on the 
public budgets is externalized onto the collectivity.  
This divergence in public spending’s net benefits appropriation leads to budgetary expansion 
and excessive spending due to special-interest politics: narrow-interest groups4 and the 
politicians representing them have clear incentives to expand spending bids to appropriate the 
maximum amount of societal resources from the common pool while bearing only limited costs 
 
4 Mancur Olson famously termed these narrow interest groups “distributional coalitions” (1986). 
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(Persson and Tabellini 2016; Ch. 7). Fiscal spending for PSWS is particularly prone to special-
interest politics because it shares the characteristics of club goods (i.e. excludability and non-
rivalry) which make spending bids particularly effective for redistributing fiscal resources from 
the general public to targeted social groups, as characteristic of clientelist exchanges (Hicken 
2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).  
In extreme cases, like in Greece before the financial crisis, politicians may unashamedly 
exchange public sector wage increases (and other benefits) for clientelist political support by 
public sector employees and unions (Trantidis 2016). But politicians’ use of public money in 
PSWS implies the in-built logic of budgetary/wage expansion in PSWS remains, even in the 
absence of clientelism. In fact, it is perfectly rational for office-seeking politicians in charge of 
PSWS to prefer expansionary wage policies. This is for two main reasons. The standard 
conflict of interest between capital and labor is absent in the public sector because there is no 
profit-making motive in the provision of public goods and services, which are not for sale. 
Second, it is because wage restraint imposes direct and visible costs to a large constituency 
with high sanctioning capacity. In fact, differently from the private sector, public employees can 
sanction public employers at the ballot box while well-organized trade unions can disrupt the 
provision of public goods5 to the community, causing a broader backlash against the 
government. Arguably, given the large size of today’s public sectors, public sector employees 
remain a hefty electoral constituency political entrepreneurs cannot easily afford to alienate 
(Beramendi et al. 2015). 
Hence, PSWS tends to be expansionary as a result of a “political exchange” (Pizzorno 1978) 
between politicians in government and the public sector workers/unions. Expansionary PSWS 
then creates negative fiscal and inflation externalities (Calmfors 1993). Expansionary PSWS 
induces higher debt/taxes or cuts in other types of public expenditures. Moreover, it generates 
inflation spillovers that worsen the country’s terms of trade, engender current account deficits 
and elicit internal or external devaluations (Johnston 2016; 2011; Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 
2014). By exchanging political support for generous wage increases, both politicians and public 
sector groups internalize the full benefits of fiscal spending for PSWS while externalizing its 
costs on society. However, the extent to which these dynamics occur varies across systems 
of PSWS governance. 
Regulation and delegation: the public sector wage-setting systems for state-led wage 
restraint 
Public economics scholarship shows that fiscal policy’s common-pool problems can be 
mitigated by specific state institutions governing budgetary decisions. Thus, cross-country 
variation in fiscal policy hinges on variation in these budgetary rules and processes 
constraining politicians’ opportunistic pursuit of special-interest politics (Alesina and Perotti 
1996; Poterba and Von Hagen 1999). Among others, two institutional configurations are 
relevant here (Von Hagen 2008): (1) the centralization of budgetary processes through 
delegation to the finance ministry and (2) ex ante regulations. 
First, under the model of centralized delegation, the common-pool problem is minimized by 
centralizing the ultimate authority on budgetary decisions within a state unit with an 
organizational mandate to guarantee sound public finance. This is to ensure responsible 
budgetary decisions be taken in the general interest rather than in response to narrow groups’ 
demands. Within the state’s institutional setting, this “fiscal entrepreneur” is the finance ministry 
whose officials’ careers and credibility hinge on their success in enforcing sound budgetary 
 
5 Public employees generally enjoy the right to strike, although limitations may exist for employees with the status of public law civil servants and to 
guarantee essential services to the community (e.g. law and order, healthcare) (Bordogna 2007). 
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policies (Jochimsen and Thomasius 2014; Moessinger 2012). Delegation involves the 
centralization of policy authority within the finance ministry or agenda-setting as well as 
monitoring and veto powers in the budgetary process. Deviations from this model result in 
fragmented budgetary decisions, which generate larger deficits. This occurs, for instance, 
when policymakers other than the finance ministry (e.g. in spending ministries) can use off-
budget funds for spending bids targeted at narrow groups without being challenged by the 
central budgetary authority (Von Hagen 2008). Second, ex ante regulation of fiscal policy 
simply refers to the adoption of predetermined rules mandating numerical constraints on 
budgetary aggregates (e.g. numerical debt ceilings), which limit budgetary decisions de jure.  
Drawing on these insights, I theorize equivalent institutional configurations of PSWS 
governance and distinguish between the delegation and the regulation models. Table 1 
provides an overview of each model’s salient traits. 
In the delegation model, the conduct of PSWS is centralized under the authority of the finance 
ministry, which enjoys various institutional mechanisms to ensure responsible PSWS. Here, 
the conflict of interest between public management and employees is reinstated “artificially” by 
delegating PSWS powers to a state actor with a vested interest in ensuring the conduct of 
fiscally responsible wage policies in contrast to politicians’ temptations to be responsive6 to the 
demand of public sector groups. 
Three configurations of the delegation model can generally be found. One involves the finance 
ministry acquiring the direct competence for wage negotiations (if collective bargaining exists) 
or wage determination (if PSWS is based on legislation). Similarly, a second configuration 
exists where the competence for PSWS is centralized under the authority of an extra-
governmental actor, i.e. an independent state agency with a legal mandate to negotiate and/or 
set wage policy according to “objective” parameters (e.g. inflation targets or private sector 
wage comparators), thus substituting political decision makers in PSWS (Ozaki 1987). Here, 
however, the mandate must grant the agency funding authority to disburse fiscal resources for 
PSWS autonomously. Otherwise, when agencies have only bargaining competences, but 
politicians control the fiscal resources for PSWS, there remains scope for special-interest 
politics because wage policy can be expanded by enlarging fiscal funding through additional 
spending bids, as the Italian case demonstrates (see p.12). Lastly, a third configuration 
consists of the finance ministry not having the competence for wage determination but holding 
the power to set ex ante budgetary limits for aggregate spending on PSWS and to veto 
decisions deviating from them.  
Thus, I advance the following first hypothesis: 
(H1) public sector wage restraint occurs within PSWS systems of governance based on the 
delegation model where the competence for the determination of public sector wage policy is 
centralized within the remit of the finance ministry or an independent state agency with funding 








6 On the distinction between responsible and responsive governments see Mair (2009). 
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Table 1: systems of PSWS governance conducive to public sector wage restraint 






1. Delegation model 
(1a) Delegation to 
Finance Ministry 
Finance Ministry 
negotiates with unions 
and/or sets public 
sector wage policies 
unilaterally 
Conflict of interest 




responsible PSWS in the 
general interest 
PSWS in German 
Länder & Portugal 




agency negotiates with 
unions and/or sets 
public sector wage 
policies unilaterally 
Conflict of interest 
between independent 
agency and public 
workers/unions; agency 
 conducts responsible 




or veto powers to 
Finance Ministry 
Finance Ministry sets 
ex ante budgetary limits 
to fiscal aggregates for 
PSWS and vetoes 
deviations 
Finance Ministry limits ex 
ante public negotiators’ 
capacity for expansionary 
wage policy or vetoes 
expansionary PSWS 
PSWS in France 
2. Regulation model 
(2) Ex ante regulation Predetermined rules 
impose ceilings to wage 
increases 
Rules tie public sector 
wage growth to 
predetermined objective 
parameters 
PSWS in Belgium 
 
 
Under the regulation model of PSWS governance, public sector wage increases are tied to 
binding numerical targets predetermined via regulation. A crucial difference exists between 
reference targets and mandatory wage ceilings. By the former, I mean targets for wage 
increases adopted by actors as focal points for wage-setting (e.g. inflation and productivity 
rates), but which are not legally binding wage ceilings. The latter, in fact, constitute a hard 
constraint on wage setters while reference targets simply orient their behavior during 
negotiations.  
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Thus, I advance the following second hypothesis: 
(H2) public sector wage restraint occurs within PSWS systems of governance based on the 
regulation model where the determination of public sector wage policy is regulated by ex ante 
rules that mandate specified wage ceilings. 
 
Logic of case selection 
I operationalize the outcomes to be explained in the case studies as two alternative trajectories 
of PSWS: expansionary versus restrictive. Expansionary/restrictive wage policies depend on 
whether real wage growth in the public sector outstrips/lags total labor productivity. Such 
operationalization is justified on the grounds that real wage growth in line with labor productivity 
ensures an equitable distribution of national income between managers and workers while 
simultaneously keeping up workers’ purchasing power and preventing wage-setting inflation 
spillovers (Marglin and Schor 1992).  
Based on most-similar and most-different systems designs (Gerring 2006), I have selected two 
case-study pairs (see Table 2). France and Italy are most-similar cases, sharing weak neo-
corporatist structures and pluralist systems of interest representation as well as other important 
similarities. Yet, in line with H1, the French state systematically pursues restrictive public sector 
wage policies, under the centralized authority of the finance ministry, within a PSWS 
governance system based on delegation. Italy, instead, suffers inflationary cycles of PSWS 
due to lack of either system of PSWS governance described above. Germany and Portugal 
are most-different cases that, despite substantial differences in industrial relations regimes, 
state structures and models of capitalism, feature public sector wage restraint thanks to PSWS 
governance systems based on the delegation model. 
Belgium and Greece I analyze as shadow cases to illustrate how, consistently with H2, the 
Belgian regulation model based on ex ante rules is superior in ensuring wage restraint as 
opposed to both the Italian and Greek systems based on reference targets.  
The empirical analysis draws on the triangulation of descriptive statistics, information from 
archival sources (see Table 3, appendix) and elite interviews with decision makers directly 
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Table 2: institutional characteristics of the cases selected for the comparative analysis 
 
Most-Similar cases Most-Different cases 
 France Italy Germany Portugal 
Degree of 
Corporatism* 
Medium-Low Medium-Low High Medium-Low 
System of Interest 
Group Representation° 
Pluralist Pluralist Corporatist Pluralist 








State Structure Unitary Unitary Federal Unitary 
Role of the State in the 
Economy ♠ 
Statist Statist Enhancing State Statist 
Predominant Level of 
PSWS ▪ 













System of PSWS 
governance  
Delegation Neither Delegation 
nor Regulation 
Delegation Delegation 
Trajectory of PSWS Restrictive Expansionary Restrictive Restrictive 
Source: author’s own research and elaboration from different sources. 
*Based on Jahn (2014)). °Based on Lijphart (2012). †Based on Hall and Soskice (2001), Molina and Rhodes (2006). ♠Based on Schmidt (2002).  ▪Based on 
Bordogna (2007). 
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The state-centered political economy of public sector wage-setting in Western 
Europe 
France: from dirigisme to competitive disinflation “in the shadow of hierarchy” 
France features a centralized system of PSWS governance based on strong agenda-setting 
and veto powers governed by the ministry of finance. Collective bargaining in the public sector 
was introduced in 1983 but agreements lack legal status and do not bind the government 
(Mossé and Tchobanian 1999). Thus, PSWS occurs predominantly in the “shadow of 
hierarchy”: when unions fail to accept the conditions set by the finance ministry, the 
government sets wage policy unilaterally through administrative acts. The state is represented 
in national negotiations with the unions by the civil service minister, but the minister of finance 
sets ex ante the budgetary margins within which the minister operates, monitors the bargaining 
process and holds a formal veto on all decisions related to the civil service (Document 1). The 
strength and autonomy of the finance ministry is enhanced further by the presence of an 
independent senior civil servant as head of the central budget authority. Differently from Italy 
and Greece, where this figure is a political appointee, the civil servant responsible for the 
central budget in France is neither changed nor reconfirmed when the government changes 
(OECD 2012). 
Figure 1 shows that such regime based on centralized delegation to the finance ministry is 
conducive to systematic public sector wage restraint. The figure also points at 1982 as the 
starting point of this trajectory. This is no coincidence; this governance regime was 
purposefully engineered by the then Finance Minister Jacques Delors as a central component 
of the shift from dirigisme to competitive fiscal and wage disinflation in the European Monetary 
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Economic governance in France is led by a relatively insulated and hierarchical bureaucracy 
(Zysman 1977). The plethora of public bodies involved in economic policymaking are 
coordinated from the top by the finance ministry, which contains the Treasury, the authority 
ultimately responsible for the country’s macroeconomic governance (Hall 1994). In fact, the 
finance ministry has been a powerful actor within the French state and the ultimate source of 
power over the direction of the economy (Eck 1986). 
Within Bretton Woods, France embodied the dirigiste state capable of centrally steering 
economic development via industrial policies (Hall 1986; Shonfield 1965; Zysman 1984). The 
state stimulated growth through deficit spending and lax monetary policy whose inflationary 
effects were counteracted via competitive devaluations (Levy 2005). The collapse of Bretton 
Woods, stagflation and the growing internationalization of the French economy made this 
strategy no longer viable. Reflationary fiscal policies became ineffective and devaluations 
problematic, insofar as they imported inflation (Hall 1994). In the 1970s, conservative liberals—
dominant in the ministry of finance, the Bank of France and the grand corps—embraced 
Germany’s model of exchange-rate stability, low inflation, balanced budgets and current 
account surpluses and backed Prime Minister Raymond Barre’s initiative to take France into 
the European Monetary System (EMS). Participation in the EMS—and EMU later—in turn 
reinforced the finance ministry’s clout over economic policy (Howarth 2001). 
In 1981, the strategy of redistributive Keynesian expansion attempted by Mitterrand’s socialist 
government led to a balance of payments deterioration and speculative pressures against the 
Franc. Mitterrand’s decision to keep France committed to the process of European monetary 
integration led to a U-turn in the country’s economic policy. The shift from dirigisme to 
competitive disinflation and a strong currency (franc fort) in the EMS implied public deficit 
reduction, wage discipline and neoliberal structural reforms to reduce the government’s scope 
in the economy (Amable, Guillaud, and Palombarini 2012; Lordon 1998). 
In industrial relations, the French state has historically played a central role to compensate for 
social partners’ fragmentation and weakness. Failed attempts to foster autonomous industrial 
relations induced extensive state regulation of the labor markets and social protection (Howell 
2011). But, while the Auroux Laws fostered private sector wage-setting decentralization and 
employment flexibility in the 1980s, in the public sector the state moved in the opposite 
direction: the finance ministry stepped up its unilateral determination of PSWS, imposing 
restrictive wage policies as the central component of competitive disinflation. 
Until the 1970s, it had been unusual for the French government to resort to incomes policies. 
Under normal circumstances, an index point (point d’indice) was used to adjust the wages of 
French public employees indexing growth to changes in the consumer price index. The first 
attempts to steer the economy’s wage trends through PSWS occurred after the first oil shock 
when the finance ministry imposed a 2% wage ceiling in the public sector to rein in inflation 
(Document 3). In 1982, Finance Minister Jacques Delors devised the reform of the indexation 
system. Against the opposition of the unions, he reconfigured the PSWS system by anchoring 
wage increases to a future target inflation rate which the finance ministry aimed to achieve, as 
opposed to past inflation (Document 3). Concomitantly, the finance ministry froze incomes, 
prices, rents and dividends until the end of 1983 through an emergency act without 
parliamentary debate.  According to Delors, this was necessary “to absorb the full effects of 
the oil crises” (Document 4). The deindexation of pay and the state’s unilateral determination 
of PSWS started to be hailed as such a success that Finance Minister Balladur, under Chirac’s 
new conservative government, imposed another unilateral public sector pay freeze in 1986. 
This was seen as a necessary accompanying measure to neutralize the inflationary effects of 
the 1986 devaluation (Document 5). In the following years, the failure to negotiate collective 
agreements with the public sector unions led the finance ministry to impose a three-stage 1.7% 
increase in 1987 (Document 6), 2% in 1988 (Document 7), despite inflation running much 
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higher. Throughout the 1990s, under the aegis of the finance ministry, various French 
governments continued the path of rigueur in PSWS, imposing pay freezes or very moderate 
increases below inflation (Document 8).  
With the advent of EMU, French policymakers have engaged creatively with stringent fiscal 
constraints to continue to exercise control over the economy (Clift and Woll 2013). In this 
context, the strategic governance of PSWS to ensure wage restraint through the finance 
ministry’s tight control of PSWS has remained key. Thus, for instance, the government 
imposed moderate wage increases in both 2001 and 2002 (Document 9). When the financial 
crisis hit, the government again froze wages unilaterally to curtail budget deficits (Bordogna 
and Pedersini 2013). 
In all, the French system of PSWS governance, organized around the centralized leadership 
of the finance ministry, has resulted in a steady trajectory of real wage growth below 
productivity. This has been key support to a strategy of disinflation throughout the process of 
European monetary integration. 
Italy: from clientelism to technocratic disinflation, and back 
Italy features a system of PSWS governance characterized by incomplete delegation to an 
independent agency and lack of binding wage ceilings. As Figure 2 indicates, this peculiar 
system leads to volatile outcomes. Cycles of opportunistic wage expansions during times of 
fiscal bonanza (1980s & 2000s) give way to unilateral wage cuts in hard times when 




In Italy, the public sector has historically been used strategically by politicians; the bureaucracy 
has long been captured by the political parties that ruled the first republic (1948-1994) 
(LaPalombara 1966; Ranci 1987). Public employment was expanded strategically to absorb 
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the large number of unemployed, especially in and from the backward South (Santoro 2014). 
Uniform national wage increases have served to distribute fiscal resources to the public sector 
constituency in the South, where living costs are much lower compared to the North (Alesina, 
Danninger, and Rostagno 2001). In PSWS, virtually all parties had their public sector clienteles 
to which they unashamedly granted wage increases and other favorable treatments ad hoc via 
legislative interventions in parliament (Ricciardi 2010; Santagata 1995). By the 1980s, public 
workers’ preferential treatment resulted in wage increases so high they jeopardized unity within 
the trade union confederations: confederal leaders could no longer justify these public sector 
privileges to workers in exposed manufacturing sectors where these opportunistic choices 
could not be replicated (Interviews 2, 3). 
As a result, before the financial and political crises of the early 1990s, union leaders had 
formally asked the government to privatize public sector employment relations and “de-
politicize” PSWS (Interviews 2, 3). The signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the crisis of the Italian 
Lira in 1992 and the Bribesville political scandal all forced budgetary restraint and ushered in 
a series of institutional reforms (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). During 1993, the technocratic 
government led by Italy’s former central banker Ciampi agreed with the social partners to 
reform the wage-setting regime; a two-tier system of coordinated wage bargaining was 
introduced. At the sectoral level wages were set by the social partners but, to ensure 
centralized inter-sectoral co-ordination, they were to be based on a national reference target: 
the expected inflation rate as agreed centrally with the social partners ahead of the yearly 
budget law. A second pillar then allowed for decentralized wage increases based on local 
productivity levels (Bordogna, Dell’Aringa, and Della Rocca 1999). Collective bargaining was 
extended to most public sector employees, who lost their public law status as civil servants. 
The representation of the state in PSWS was delegated to an independent agency (ARAN) 
with the aim of ensuring wage moderation within a system hitherto plagued by clientelism. 
Public sector wage freezes were imposed by the technocratic government and wage 
moderation in collective agreements followed throughout the 1990s (Dell’Aringa 1997), not 
least because of a general consensus on the need to join EMU at its onset (Regalia and Regini 
1998). 
Special-interest politics in PSWS returned under Silvio Berlusconi’s center-right coalition, in 
power during the 2000s, and is symptomatic of the broad-ranging flaws of Italy’s PSWS 
governance system. With Berlusconi’s consent, deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini 
orchestrated ways, in liaison with the unions, to circumvent ARAN’s independent role in PSWS. 
After the fall of the Christian Democratic party, Fini’s political party (Alleanza Nazionale) had 
found its main electoral constituency in public employees—especially rooted in Southern 
Italy—and maintained strong ties with the CISL trade union confederation, the most 
representative in the public sector (Baglioni 2011). Against the will of the then Finance Minister 
Giulio Tremonti—eventually forced to resign—Fini could exploit loopholes in the newly created 
system of PSWS governance to his party’s and Berlusconi’s political advantage. 
Under the new system, ARAN received the competence to negotiate with trade unions during 
the biannual renewals of collective agreements. However, the government maintained for itself 
the competence to establish the budgetary resources for PSWS, which would have to be 
earmarked before allowing ARAN to negotiate with the unions. At the same time, no regulations 
existed to set binding ceilings to wage increases. Legislation only envisaged the social partners 
anchoring their wage negotiations to the expected rate of inflation. The expected rate of 
inflation the government aimed to achieve, however, was to be negotiated with the social 
partners and serve as a focal point for sectoral negotiations. De facto, for the public sector this 
system implied the government would earmark the total resources for PSWS in budget laws 
before ARAN entered negotiations with the unions. Thus, unions knew the quantum of 
government funding before wage negotiations. ARAN’s mandate simply consisted in 
negotiating how to distribute resources across the various public sector compartments (Talamo 
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2009). The trade unions, unhappy with the government’s initial offers, repeatedly refused to 
sign collective agreements with ARAN and shifted the negotiating table back to the political 
arena. By exploiting the already earmarked funding in budget laws as wage floors, they could 
bid up and push their political referents to grant larger increases in future budget laws 
(Interviews 3, 4, 5). 
Ahead of the 2002-2003 round, for instance, the government had earmarked resources 
equivalent to a 4.5% increase, despite union demands for 6% (Document 10). The unions 
refused to enter negotiations with ARAN and called for various public sector strikes. At around 
the same time, Berlusconi launched a campaign to liberalize the labor market, which had 
enraged the left-leaning CGIL union confederation and led to sizeable strikes. To divide the 
unions and prevent a general backlash against the government’s agenda, Berlusconi urged a 
political mediation led by Deputy Prime Minister Fini to exchange larger public sector wage 
increases for political support. To this end, Fini met privately with CISL’s leader Savino 
Pezzotta during winter 2002 (Interview 6) and worked out an agreement to increase fiscal 
endowments for PSWS (Interview 7). Eventually, the government met union demands, 
enlarging resources in the subsequent budget law, and then mandated ARAN to sign collective 
agreements (Document 11). The CGIL remained isolated in demonstrating against the 
government and the labor market reform passed at the end of 2002 (Document 12). 
A similar dynamic of political exchange occurred in the following 2004-2005 bargaining round. 
Unions opposed the government’s initial offer, circumvented ARAN and, again, managed to 
extract greater resources for more generous wage increases engineered by Fini’s political 
mediation with the CISL (Di Carlo 2018b). However, while Fini pursued his party’s interests via 
PSWS, ahead of the 2004 European elections, the Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti strongly 
opposed expensive public sector wage increases. Repeated confrontations between the two 
resulted in Tremonti eventually resigning in 2004 due to Berlusconi’s support for the public 
sector cause before the elections (Interview 6). 
In all, despite the attempted depoliticization of PSWS, incomplete delegation left scope for the 
return of special-interest politics in national PSWS. Simultaneously, during the early 2000s 
expansionary wage growth occurred at the decentralized level where local administrations 
increasingly made use of off-budget funds as top-ups over the national agreements (Bordogna 
2002). Decentralized fragmented PSWS, beyond the reach of a central budgetary authority, 
resulted in inflation spillovers, which contributed substantially to overall public sector wage 
inflation in the mid-2000s (ARAN 2006). Hence, during times of fiscal availability, PSWS has 
tended to be inflationary. However, during hard times, finance ministers within technocratic 
governments have had to rectify previous excesses via unilateral actions. Similar to the 1990s, 
after the 2008 financial crisis outburst, the then (again) Finance Minister Tremonti imposed a 
three-year wage freeze in PSWS and cuts for highly ranked civil servants through an 
emergency package (Bordogna and Pedersini 2013). As the Italian crisis grew into a full-
fledged sovereign debt crisis, and Mario Monti’s technocratic government came to power, 
PSWS was frozen for seven years until a 2015 Constitutional Court’s sentence instructed the 
government to restart collective negotiations with the unions. 
Shadow cases: Belgium and Greece 
Both Belgium and Greece used to have a system of wage-indexation based on price inflation. 
Under pressure to meet the Maastricht criteria, in 1996 both countries adopted important 
reforms of the wage-setting system. They make for perfect shadow cases because, at about 
the same time, Belgium strengthened its model of PSWS governance based on ex ante rules, 
while Greece failed to adopt either a delegation or a regulation system of PSWS governance. 
As Figure 3a shows, the Belgian model of regulation is conducive to moderate and stable 
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public sector wage growth, while Greece (Figure 3b)—like Italy—shows cycles of excessive 




In Belgium, PSWS is centralized at the national level. Three negotiating committees exist, but 
issues of national PSWS are dealt with in “Committee A”, where representatives of the federal 
government, the communities and regional governments negotiate with the trade unions 
(Document 13). Wage-setting occurs under “the shadow of the law” (Dorssemont 2019). 
Already in 1989, the Belgian government had adopted a so-called “law to safeguard the 
country’s competitiveness.” Accordingly, after wage agreements had been reached and 
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implemented, the social partners and the government were mandated to assess the 
competitiveness of Belgian firms vis-à-vis its seven major commercial partners. In case of 
competitiveness losses, the social partners had to moderate wage growth ex post to realign 
unit labor costs with those of the seven trading partners. In case of failure to reach an 
agreement by the social partners on how to proceed, the government would be mandated to 
act unilaterally to reestablish the country’s competitiveness. In 1996, this regulatory model was 
strengthened further in light of EMU entry (Pochet 2004). To ensure a wage floor, increases 
would be indexed automatically to the inflation rate, while the upper ceiling for maximum wage 
increases would be set based on the forecast average pay rises of Belgium’s three ma jor 
trading partners: France, Germany, the Netherlands (Document 14). In this way, special-
interest politics in PSWS is ruled out, for wage negotiations occur within predetermined binding 
wage floors and ceilings. However, given the difficulty of reaching collective agreements in a 
very fragmented system, PSWS has often been limited to automatic indexation to inflation 
(Document 13). 
In Greece, index-linked wage-setting was introduced in the public sector in 1984, thanks to 
legislation setting automatic wage adjustments in line with inflation every three months 
(Document 15). However, the lack of a centralized budgetary authority overseeing PSWS 
meant the PSWS system was, like in Italy, fragmented and informal. Spending ministries and 
other units of the public administration could use off-budget funds to grant top-ups above 
indexed pay increases, beyond the finance ministry’s reach (Interview 20). Informal bargaining 
with employees and unions led to the uncontrolled expansion of wage growth through ad hoc 
administrative acts within the different state units (Ioannou 1996). 
Under pressure to meet the Maastricht criteria, in 1996 the social democratic government led 
by Costas Simitis attempted to rationalize the PSWS system. It consolidated the various 
ministerial pay levels and allowances into minimum rates applicable to the whole public sector 
(Document 16). To contain spending and keep the wage bill constant in terms of GDP, it also 
introduced an informal guideline to anchor PSWS to the growth of real GDP (Interview 20). 
Yet, the governance of PSWS was neither brought under the full control of the finance ministry, 
nor was it regulated by binding wage ceilings like in Belgium.  
During EMU’s first decade, the various public administrations again started employing their 
own extra funds to expand the public sector and provide top ups to wages and benefits (e.g. 
pensions), outside the basic wage increases provided in the government’s general budget 
(Interview 20). Until the financial crisis, wage increases were thus granted opportunistically 
without any economic or financial considerations (Interview 19). When the crisis hit, and push 
came to shove, the finance ministry “did not even know the exact number of public employees 
across the Greek public administration, let alone differences in the level of compensation 
across various state units” (Interview 19). The Troika interventions then led to unilateral wage 
cuts, major retrenchment in public employee benefits and the introduction of a unified 
remuneration system for the public sector (Ioannou 2013), which was eventually centralized 
under the control of the finance ministry (Interview 19). 
Germany: from centralization to organized-decentralization and competitive 
federalism 
Germany’s federal polity features a hybrid system of PSWS governance where the delegation 
of key PSWS powers to finance ministers takes place at various levels of the state. Figure 4 
shows this model is conducive to systematic public sector wage restraint. However, the 
peculiar trajectory of remarkable public sector restraint must be understood, considering 
Germany’s post-reunification fiscal crisis. 
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Given the federal structure, the state is represented in PSWS at three different levels. The 
federal Ministry of the Interior represents the federal government. The Länder are represented 
collectively by the Association of German States (TdL), grouping together the finance ministers 
from all the states but Hesse, which pulled out in 2004. Municipal governments are represented 
collectively by the Association of Municipal Employers (VKA). Until the reforms of the mid-
2000s, Germany’s PSWS system was highly centralized at the national level and coordinated 
across the two different employment categories: public employees (Tarifbeschäftigte) 
subjected to collective bargaining and civil servants (Beamte) whose wage conditions were set 
via federal legislation (Keller 1999). Vertical centralization within the state was de facto 
ensured by a bargaining coalition of the three state levels led by the federal Ministry of the 
Interior. Once contracts were signed with the unions, the ministry would then bring legislation 
to the federal parliament to extend the collective bargaining provisions to the country’s civil 
servants with a federal law. In this way, employment and wage conditions remained 




In this centralized system, wage restraint was ensured by finance ministers in multiple ways. 
At the federal level, the Minister of the Interior acts in liaison with state secretaries in the finance 
ministry who must approve formally the provisions of collective agreements to ensure 
budgetary restraint (Interview 1). At the states’ level, PSWS is the direct responsibility of 
regional finance ministers who first coordinate horizontally within the TdL to reach a unitary 
position in PSWS, and then coordinate vertically with the federal finance ministry ahead of 
negotiations with the unions. Overall, until the 2000s it was the federal ministry of finance to 
have the upper hand in PSWS via its tight control over the Ministry of the Interior. During the 
1990s, the Finance Minister Theo Waigel, for instance, steered very restrictive public sector 
wage increases and even civil servant wage freezes (in 1994) to rein in the ballooning post-
reunification budget deficit on the road to EMU. Paradoxically, between 1996 and 1997, 
Germany risked breaching the Maastricht Treaty’s 3% deficit ceiling. To rein in the deficit, he 
had a savings package adopted that severely curtailed fiscal funding for PSWS during 1996. 
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Put against the wall, the unions came to accept a moderate lump-sum to avoid other major 
cuts in sick pay and the extension of working hours (Di Carlo 2019). 
Once in EMU, however, the fiscal crisis of the German state deteriorated further (Streeck 
2007). Most importantly, Chancellor Gerard Schroeder’s tax reform in 2000 dug a hole in 
subnational governments’ tax revenues, forcing subsequent expenditure cuts. In dire straits, 
the states’ finance ministers pulled out of the public employers’ bargaining coalition and 
imposed meagre wage increases, which contributed to the public sector wage deterioration 
during the early 2000s (Figure 4). Negotiations then began with the unions on how to reform 
the whole collective bargaining framework. In 2005, the representatives of the federal and 
municipal employers agreed to continue negotiating collectively with the unions within a new 
joint collective bargaining framework, i.e. the TVöD contract (Interviews 11, 12).  
The states, instead, demanded their own bargaining framework to gain independence from the 
federal level—deemed not restrictive enough—and from the municipal level where unions 
remained strong and capable of disrupting the provision of local essential services. The reform 
of the state’s collective bargaining framework developed in tandem with negotiations for the 
2006 constitutional reform. A double process of institutional and constitutional change thus 
ensued. In 2006, the states agreed to continue negotiating collectively with the unions within 
a newly established framework, i.e. the TV-L contract. Concomitantly, with the 2006 
constitutional reform—under the leadership of rich Länder like Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg—the states obtained from the federal level the competence to legislate on the 
wage and employment conditions of their respective civil servants (Interviews 9, 13, 14). 
Ever since, the new system combines elements of organized decentralization in collective 
bargaining (which now occurs on two main levels) and competitive federalism because each 
state now sets its civil servants’ wage conditions independently. Despite this apparent 
fragmentation due to Germany’s federal polity, wage restraint remains in-built in PSWS thanks 
to national-level coordination within the public employers’ associations.  
In states’ level collective bargaining (TV-L contract), the various regional finance ministers 
coordinate within TdL to reach a unitary position vis-à-vis the unions. This implies consensus-
based agreements are only possible if they reflect the interests of all participant finance 
ministers. For this to happen, the TdL must represent the general interest of all states in PSWS 
and this leaves no room to accommodate the political and electoral interests of states’ 
politicians in PSWS (Interview 8). Moreover, the need to reach negotiated agreements within 
TdL leads finance ministers to converge around the adoption of moderate wage policies. This 
is because Germany’s rich and poor states within TdL have very different levels of fiscal 
capacity and thus financial vulnerability. These differences can hardly be reconciled due to 
states’ lack of fiscal autonomy. In fact, states have very large wage bills due to the 
decentralization of administrative competencies within the German federal polity. However, 
they cannot adjust their revenues independently because tax policy is a federal competence 
to which states participate only jointly via the upper chamber (Bundesrat) (Benz 1999). Given 
the mismatch between high administrative expenditures and constrained fiscal capacity, 
states’ finance ministers (and municipalities) are under constant pressure to minimize the fiscal 
burden of PSWS (Benz and Sonnicksen 2017). While expansionary PSWS is generally not a 
problem for rich states (e.g. Bavaria)—with vibrant local economies and higher fiscal 
capacity—, for poorer states (e.g. Saarland) it becomes instead a matter of financial survival. 
Thus, negotiated compromises on wage policies within the TdL are only reachable if set around 
the lowest common denominator, i.e. around meagre wage increases poor states can afford 
to pay (Di Carlo 2019). Otherwise, as occurred in the early 2000s, poorer states would start 
quitting the employers’ association, leading to the collapse of state-level coordinated 
bargaining.  
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For analogous reasons, a similar compromise around moderate wage policies must be 
reached in the TVöD contract where the federal and municipal levels bargain collectively. Here, 
negotiated wage policies are only possible to the extent to which they incorporate the financial 
concerns of the many cash-stripped municipalities across Germany (Interview 10). 
In all, thanks to resilient horizontal coordination within the employers’ associations, the 
reformed system of PSWS in Germany continues to work as a functional equivalent to the 
previously centralized system of PSWS. Within this new system, based on organized-
decentralization, PSWS remains delegated to finance ministers and municipal wage-setters, 
who coordinate within their respective national employers’ associations. The need for 
negotiated compromises in the members’ general interest forces the public employers to 
conduct fiscally responsible PSWS, leaving no room to accommodate local level political and 
electoral considerations in PSWS. 
Portugal: from authoritarianism to state-led rigor “in the shadow of Europe” 
Portugal features a centralized system of PSWS governance where wage-setting is the 
responsibility of the minister of finance who negotiates nationally within three separate tables 
based on trade-union affiliation (Document 17). While other ministers do negotiate on various 
aspects specific to their ministries’ employment terms, wage determination is centralized under 
the sole responsibility of the finance minister who sets PSWS for the whole public sector to 
ensure coherent incomes policies and sound public finances (OECD 1997, 45). Figure 5 shows 
that, since Portugal’s democratization, this system of delegation in PSWS governance has 
been conducive to moderate real wage increases below or in line with labor productivity. Like 
France, the state—through the finance ministry—plays a pivotal role in PSWS. This reflects 
both Portugal’s authoritarian past and the failure to reach negotiated agreements with the 
social partners within a fragmented system of interest representation. 
Until 1974, Portugal was under the conservative authoritarian regime established with 
Salazar’s Estado Novo. Within the corporatist system, unions and employers were subdued to 
the regime, strikes were forbidden, and wage-setting subordinated to the regime’s priorities. 
With the new democratic constitution in 1976, independent trade unionism was established 
but, until the early 1980s, wage determination continued unilaterally via statutory incomes 
policies (Document 18). The government decreed national wage ceilings (tectos salariais) 
setting the wage rate across all sectors (Barreto 1998). After 1984, the Grand Coalition 
government supported by the center-left socialists (PS) and the conservatives (PSD) 
established the Standing Committee for Social Concertation (SCSC) as a forum to stabilize 
democratic industrial relations, promote concertation with the social partners and curb inflation 
in light of Portugal’s entry into the European Economic Community (Campos Lima and 
Naumann 2011). Initially, a series of social pacts were signed covering not only incomes policy 
but also aspects of social policy and labor market regulation (Dornelas 2010). However, 
subsequent attempts to reach negotiated pay agreements in the SCSC failed repeatedly, 
leaving the government no option other than taking the lead in national wage policy (Document 
18). 
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In this context, led by the ministry of finance, the Portuguese state began to use PSWS 
strategically to govern the process of wage formation across the whole economy. By the end 
of the year, the finance ministry would set a national pay norm based on the forecast inflation 
rate as a focal point for negotiations ahead. Soon into the new year, the public sector trade 
unions filed formal requests for wage increases based on which the finance minister would join 
negotiations considering the government’s budget constraints and other relevant economic 
considerations (Campos Lima 2008). Generally, no later than February, if no agreement could 
be reached on the offer advanced by the finance ministry, wage increases in the public sector 
would be set unilaterally as a reference for wage increases across the whole economy. 
Although collective bargaining in the Portuguese public sector was then introduced in 1998, 
the government is not bound to accept the validity of collective contracts, which acquire legal 
status only after government recognition. Hence, similar to France, PSWS occurs in the 
shadow of hierarchy because, in case of no agreement, the finance minister defines PSWS 
unilaterally through an administrative act (Campos Lima 2008). 
While this practice of public sector-led pattern bargaining became institutionalized during the 
1990s (Document 19), state unilateralism in Portugal’s PSWS became particularly pronounced 
during the 2000s, thanks to mounting budget deficits and the threat of sanctions from the 
European Council under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). In fact, despite the European Council failing to issue early warnings to Germany 
and Portugal in 2001, and the EDP for Germany being suspended in late 2003, Portuguese 
governments still considered the SGP as a hard external constraint (Stoleroff 2007), especially 
for fear of losing access to Europe’s structural funds (Magone 2017, 34). Thus, during the 
years before the financial crisis, restrictive wage policy in the public sector was repeatedly 
imposed unilaterally under both the center-right coalition government and the following 
Socialist majority government. 
The socialist government of Antonio Gutierres had fallen in the early 2000s largely because 
the center-right parties had capitalized on the socialists’ failure to counteract the worsening of 
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the country’s public finances (Campos Lima and Naumann 2011). In his electoral campaign, 
contender José Manuel Barroso openly proclaimed his intention to implement an unpopular 
liberal platform, centered on fiscal/administrative reforms and tax cuts. Once elected, Manuela 
Ferreira Leite—known as the iron lady for her hard-headed approach to public finances—was 
appointed finance minister with a mandate to bring the budget deficit below the 3% ceiling 
(Document 20).  
With the finance ministry committed to push through restrictive PSWS, negotiations with the 
unions broke down relatively soon (Document 21). Ahead of the 2003 negotiations, unions 
went on strike, paralyzing the health, education and legal services; the finance ministry ignored 
union demands and advanced a non-negotiable 3.6% pay rise and a cost-effective 
rationalization of the civil service. As time went by, lack of agreement led the finance ministry 
to impose a 2.75% wage increase, below the expected rate of inflation (Document 22). In 2004, 
despite inflation forecast at around 3%, again the state unilaterally granted a 2% wage increase 
only to workers in the lower pay grades, while imposing a unilateral freeze for the remaining 
categories (Document 23). 
The situation did not change with the advent of the new socialist government led by Sócrates 
in spring 2005. During 2005 and 2006 the new government continued with either wage freezes 
or increases significantly below the forecast rate of inflation. In 2005, with public sector unions 
demanding between 3.5% and 5.5%, the state initially offered 2.3%, in line with forecast 
inflation. As negotiations went by, Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos, brought the 
offer down to 1.5% justifying a policy of restraint as a “national imperative” (Stoleroff 2007, 
645). Due to budgetary concerns, the state imposed a 1.5% increase in both 2005 and 2006 
against the opposition of all the public sector unions.  
Overall, despite fierce opposition by the unions, Portuguese finance ministers in charge of 
PSWS have traditionally pursued a restrictive wage policy for the country’s public sector as an 
instrument of economic governance to shore up public finances and ensure Portugal’s 
continuing participation in the EMU and access to Europe’s structural funds. When the 
sovereign debt crisis hit, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the 
Troika, the Portuguese government went on unilaterally imposing a combination of further 
wage freezes and cuts to both civil servants and public companies’ employees (Rato 2013). 
Conclusions 
This paper has argued that PSWS is not primarily a problem of inter-sectoral wage co-
ordination between sheltered and exposed industries. In fact, cross-country variation in PSWS 
cannot be explained fully by the presence/absence of neo-corporatist wage-setting regimes. 
Although insightful, by virtue of its excessive focus on rent-seeking trade unions, extant 
literature fails to capture the fiscal nature of PSWS and the political incentives of public sector 
wage-setters. The state-centered theoretical framework proposed in this paper attempts to 
make a first step in the direction of taking the specifics of PSWS into account, rather than 
treating the public sector as a mere satellite of export-sector interests. 
Without needing to embrace full-fledged “public choice” accounts of malevolent politicians, 
highlighting the common-pool problem of PSWS simply helps us focus on dynamics of special-
interest politics, which are central in processes of PSWS. I have argued that variation in PSWS 
can be explained in terms of different PSWS governance systems. In countries with PSWS 
systems based on the delegation model, wage restraint occurs because the competence for 
the determination of PSWS ultimately falls within the remits of the fiscally-responsible finance 
ministry or an independent state agency with powers to ensure the conduct of de-politicized 
PSWS. In countries with a PSWS system based on the regulation model, wage restraint occurs 
because PSWS is regulated ex ante by mandatory wage ceilings. When neither of these two 
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governance systems is present, PSWS tends to be inflationary and volatile for it depends on 
the political employers’ fiscal capacity to adopt expansionary wage policies. 
These findings yield interesting insights for the burgeoning literature on growth models 
(Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Hassel and Palier 2021). In fact, wage-setting regimes shape 
both the demand and supply side of an economy because they determine workers’ incomes 
(i.e. their consumption capacity) and the emergence of inflation externalities that might 
jeopardize export-oriented growth strategies (Baccaro and Pontusson 2018). While research 
on private-sector wage-setting abounds, in the political economy scholarship PSWS is often 
forgotten. Considering the large size of today’s welfare states, it is important to better 
understand the determinants of public sector wage growth across different countries and shed 
light on how PSWS governance systems foster or undermine different growth strategies. For 
example, the case studies clearly indicate that, even within most-similar cases of statist political 
economies, the state can govern PSWS to prevent negative externalities, like in France or 
Portugal, or can itself be the source of inflation spillovers, like in Italy or Greece. This paper’s 
findings thus suggest the need for political economy scholarship to pay closer attention to 
PSWS and, more specifically, the role of state actors and states’ institutional configurations in 
shaping growth strategies. 
However, this paper does not suggest that restrictive wage policies are normatively superior 
to inflationary wage-setting, as implicit in the neo-corporatist literature. To the contrary, I see 
trajectories of wage restraint and inflation as equally problematic, for opposite reasons. 
Systematic wage restraint in the public sector undermines the consumption capacity of large 
parts of the middle class, weakening domestic demand. Conversely, sustained wage inflation 
generates inflation and fiscal externalities, which must eventually be redressed through drastic 
measures, as the Greek and Italian cases demonstrate. Thus, the policy implication of this 
paper is that states should instead use their sovereign capacity to act as model employers in 
the economy, i.e. making sure that real wages in the public sector grow roughly in line with the 
economy’s total labor productivity. This “golden rule” of wage-setting prevents the emergence 
of negative externalities and ensures a stable distribution of national income between 
managers and workers while simultaneously allowing consumption to grow roughly in line with 
production (Marglin and Schor 1992). Through the proactive governance of PSWS – i.e. 
pattern bargaining led by the public sector –, states could therefore try to stabilize wage-setting 
across the whole economy by setting a political wage norm in the public sector which private 
sector’s wage setters will ultimately have to consider during collective bargaining.  
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Appendix 
Statistical data on wages, inflation and productivity comes from the OECD Stan Database and, 
whenever unavailable there, from the EU KLEMS Database.  
To retrieve specific information on processes and outcomes of PSWS, I have relied on two 
different archives: the European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR) and the Eurofound’s EIRO 
archives. EIRR consists of a very rich and detailed physical archive containing reports on 
industrial relations matters on a monthly basis. The archive covers most European countries 
over the period 1974-2006. The EIRO digital archive covers similar topics from approximately 
1997 onwards.  
The documents cited in the paper are collected in Table 3. 
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9 Negotiations Fail Over Civil 
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27 May 2001 Eurofound 
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10 Unions criticise government over 
2002 budget plans 






11 Government and unions reach 
agreement for public sector 
12 March 2002 Eurofound 
12 Labour Market Reforms Bill 
Passed 
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Next to these archival sources, I have conducted elite interviews with key decision makers 
involved directly in PSWS in Germany, Greece and Italy during the period 2017-2021. 
However, despite multiple attempts, I have been unable to obtain interviews from policymakers 
in Portugal and France.  
The interviews cited in the paper are collected in Table 4. 
Table 4: List of interviews 
Interview 
n. 
Country/Case Institution Position Date Location 
1 Germany Federal 
Finance 
Ministry 
State Secretary 10/4/2017 Berlin 





Former leader of the 





3 Italy National Court 
of Auditors 
High rank official in 




4 Italy ARAN Director of Research 
Department 
4/12/2017 Rome 
5 Italy ARAN President 
(and former official in 
the top echelons of 
the Ministry of 
Finance) 
4/12/2017 Rome 
6 Italy Union of the 
Centre 
(Political Party) 




7 Italy CISL (Trade 
Union) 




Official in the top 
echelons 
19/7/2017 Berlin 
9 Germany Economics 
Ministry, 
Bavaria 
Economic Minister 3/7/2017 Munich 




11 Germany Verdi Official in the top 
echelons 
11/4/2016 Berlin 
12 Germany Verdi Joint interview with 
n. 3 officials in the 
top echelons 
19/1/2017 Berlin 
13 Germany Dbb Official in the top 
echelons 
7/2/2017 Berlin 
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14 Germany Dbb Official in the top 
echelons 
15/3/2017 Berlin 
15 Germany DGB  4/1/2017 Berlin 
16 Italy Finance 
Ministry 
Official in the top 
echelons 
11/1/2018 Rome 
17 Italy ARAN Former president 27/11/201
7 
Milan 
18 Italy ARAN Former president 7/2/2018 Rome 










Official in the top 
echelons 
6/3/2018 Zoom Call 
 
 
 
 
 
 
